Agricultural cooperativization is the socio-economic change of transforming the individual peasant economy based on the private ownership in the rural areas into the socialist collective economy.
It forms the main contents in solving the rural matters in the stage of the socialist revolution.
It is the necessary demand for removing the root cause of exploitation and poverty in the rural areas, ridding peasants of all sorts of exploitation and oppression, freeing the agricultural productivity from the fetters of the old production relations and developing agriculture on a planned basis like industry. It is also the necessary demand for further solidifying the worker-peasant union and consolidating the rural position.
Agricultural cooperativization in the DPRK began after the war according to the original policy of President Kim Il Sung and was successfully completed in a short time of 4-5 years until August 1958.
President Kim Il Sung said.
“Thanks to the correct policy and energetic guidance of our Party and the Government of the Republic the cooperative movement was promoted at a faster rate and completed across the country in August 1958.”
The successful realization of agricultural cooperativization was the brilliant fruition of the wise leadership of President Kim Il Sung and the historic event that opened a new road of the socio-economic development in the DPRK.
Then how did the DPRK solve the problem of agricultural cooperativization?
First of all, the DPRK chose properly the time of agricultural cooperativization from the Juche-oriented standpoint.
It is important to properly choose the time in cooperativizing the rural economy. The movement of agricultural cooperativization can suffer setbacks and twists if it takes place in wrong time or begins so early or so late as all the revolutionary movements did.
To cooperativize the private farming is the important task of the socialist revolution, but it is not urgent from the beginning of the stage of the socialist revolution. Korea carried out the democratic revolution for 1-2 years after the liberation and entered the period of transition to socialism. However in the early period of transition the task of agricultural cooperativization was not a matured demand.
After liberation the peasants who became the masters of the land through land reform supported the policy of the Party and the state and their patriotic zeal and will to produce were heig
This period Korea directed main efforts to consolidating the successes of the land reform and displaying its vitality and partly prepared to transform the rural economy in a socialist way.
When making the land reform, it enforced the policy of restricting the development of economy of rich peasants, main objects of the struggle to create conditions favorable for the future cooperativization of the rural economy. It saw that the superiority of cooperative economy was shown to the peasants through the consuming farm, the cooperative economy in the circulating field that they organized by collecting money.
As a preparation for cooperativization, the state agro-stock farm, farm machine hire station and draught animal hire station were organized and ox sharing, labour aid and other cooperative labor types that the peasants had been doing since a long time ago widely spread in encouragement. Labour-aid and ox-sharing teams were broadly formed and operated especially in the Fatherland Liberation War when the rural areas had lack of labour forces, draught animals and farm machines, whic
The cooperativization of the rural economy in the DPRK was a matured demand after the war.
The rural economy was seriously destroyed due to the 3-year war.
There were a little draught animals and farm machines indispensable for farming and lack of labour forces. Some peasants could not do farming properly for lack of labour forces though they had draught animals and farm machines. The others could not do farming properly for lack of draught animals and farm machines though they had labour forces. In a word, the peasants were in a position that they could not do farming without pooling their efforts and cooperating.
After the war the living standards of the peasants were very low.
Owing to the war, their means of life were almost broken and they had lack of food and clothing. Nearly 40% of peasants were reduced to petty peasants.
Under such conditions it was impossible to develop rapidly the agricultural production and solve the peasants’ problems of food and living which were very difficult after the war as long as the individual peasant economy remained. If so, it caused unbalance between industry restored and developed rapidly on a planned basis and agriculture restored slowly, giving a big obstacle to the development of industry and national economy as a whole. Like this after the war the reality of the DPRK urgently demanded cooperativization of the private peasant economy.
Rural areas were under the conditions favorable for agricultural cooperativization.
Owing to the fierce 3-year war, the rural areas were severely destroyed, but on contrast peasants were trained and awakened in a revolutionary way. In the trials of the war the peasants realized the validity of the Party’s policy and preciousness of the people’s government, firmly united around the Party and the government and confirmed that victory and happiness are in store for them only when they advance along the road indicated by the Party. The peasants were politically awakened and firmly rallied behind the Party while the rich peasants weakened. Houses, farm tools and draught oxen of the middle and well-to-do middle peasants were confiscated and they are impoverished. The rich-peasant farming was almost destroyed and trifling.
After the war the peasants’ concept of ownership of land was very low. Even though they had land, they could not cultivate it for lack of draught oxen, farm tools and labour forces, so their concept of ownership of land was not so strong as that just after the land reform.
The postwar period was the time favorable for agricultural cooperativization both from the view of the relationship of class forces and the peasants’ position and ideological preparedness. If one tried to cooperativize after missing such a favorable time and with the restoration of rich peasants and middle peasants, it could be difficult. Thus the DPRK recognized the postwar period as the time most adequate for agricultural cooperativization and set forth the policy of cooperativizing the individual peasant economy.
This was the Juche-oriented policy of agricultural cooperativization totally free from the dogmatic viewpoint that agricultural cooperativization could not be done before industrialization.
The decisive factor of victory is the masses of the people both in the revolutionary struggle and construction work. The DPRK did not need to postpone the socialist transformation of the rural economy because we could not have modern farm machines until industrialization was realized under the condition that the peasant masses, the performers and masters of the rural economy urgently demanded cooperativization. It was the steadfast viewpoint and will of the Workers’ Party of Korea that agricultural cooperativization was possible under the condition that life urgently demanded the transformation of the old relationship of production and the revolutionary forces to undertake it were prepared even though productivity and level of development of technology had been quite low.
The DPRK also saw that it was important to strictly adhere to the voluntary principle in cooperativizing agriculture.
The voluntary principle is the demand stemming from the essence of the movement of agricultural cooperativization.
As agricultural cooperativization is the movement to defend the interests of the peasants and make them well-off, the method of compulsorily dragging peasants into the agricultural cooperative association is never tolerable. Agricultural cooperativization is not only the undertaking for peasants but also the revolutionary task of themselves. Therefore it can be carried out successfully only when the peasants themselves voluntarily attend. The compulsive method brings only the results of weakening the worker-peasant union and decreasing the revolutionary zeal of the peasants.
But the voluntary principle implies by no means that agricultural cooperativization resorts to spontaneity. In order to observe the voluntary principle it is important to take various measures so that the peasants volunteer to join the agricultural cooperative association.
The best method in observing the voluntary principle was practical education.
Individual peasants always kept their livelihood in an unstable position by doing small peasant farming through generations, so they are conservative and timid and they are not willing to accept before recognizing anything as good through their experiences after seeing it.
The DPRK, in consideration of such characteristics of peasants, widely disseminated the superiority of the agricultural cooperative association among them while setting the stage of experiences of agricultural cooperativization and showing its superiority to them by setting the practical example.
It was also important to define the type of the association correctly and that the peasants themselves choose the type suitable to them in observing the voluntary principle in the movement of agricultural cooperativization.
It was important to choose various types of cooperative economy that peasants of broad sections can easily accept and choose the type according to their opinion in order to make all the peasants volunteer to join the cooperative economy under the condition that land was privately owned by the peasants and their ideological preparedness was different.
The DPRK defined the t
In case of rich peasants, the DPRK limited their exploitative aspects and made them volunteer to join the cooperative economy.
Keeping the voluntary principle was an important factor that developed the movement of agricultural cooperativization onto the solid basis.
The DPRK also set correctly the stage of development of agricultural cooperativization movement and realized it not at a time but gradually.
It is important to set correctly the successive stage of cooperatizing agriculture in consideration of composition of peasants according to strata, their ideological and conscious level and specific situation of the rural areas in successfully cooperatizing agriculture.
President Kim Il Sung set forth the stages of experience, mass development and completion of the agricultural cooperativization movement in keeping with the actual situation of the DPRK and saw that the movement was vigorously launched by relying on the voluntary principle and guide and aid of the Party and the state.
The first stage of the agricultural cooperativization movement was the stage of experience.
Setting up the stage of experience is of important significance in making the peasants support cooperativization and enter the cooperatives voluntarily by showing practical models to them. It also enables the officials to gain experiences of organizing and managing cooperatives suitable to the special situation of the country. The DPRK set up the period between 1953 and 1954 as the stage of experience for cooperativization and organized a few cooperatives in each county on an experimental basis. The state lent the needed seed and food to the newly organized cooperatives, provided them primarily with farming equipment and fertilizers and gave a long-term loan so that they could buy draught oxen, farming equipment, farming materials, etc. The state also took measures that the superiority of cooperatives was displayed immediately by establishing farm-machine and draught oxen hire stations and ensuring primarily the plough and transportation of farming materials for cooperatives.
The next of the agricultural cooperativization was the stage of mass development. It was the stage in which the middle peasants and other broad peasant masses enter the cooperatives on a massive scale.
In this stage it was important to consolidate cooperative qualitatively. The WPK enhanced the class awareness and consciousness of socialism and collectivism among the members and build up the class position of farms to strengthen the cooperatives politically and ideologically. It also paid big attention to building the cooperative economically and technically. The state supplied lots of chemical fertilizers, farming machines, building material to the rural areas and lent foods, seeds and fund to the cooperatives whose economic foundation was weak. From 1956 it enforced the fixed tax system, decreased remarkably the rate of tax in kind and made the members of cooperatives pay tax less than the private peasants. It marked up the procurement price for common products of the cooperatives and gave labour assistance to them in every important farming period. It also improved the management and administration of the cooperatives to consolidate the newly organized ones.
The third stage of the agricultural cooperativization was the stage of completion. The main task of the stage was to admit the rich peasants, the peasants doing farming and marketing around towns and those living in mountainous regions into the cooperatives to complete the transformation of private peasant economy on a socialist basis. On the basis of the scientific analysis of the characteristics of the rich peasant economy and the balance of class force, the DPRK restricted and gradually transformed the rich peasants instead of liquidating them by the method of plundering. It admitted the people who were doing farming and marketing around towns into the agricultural cooperatives or producer’s and sales cooperatives according to their wish. It organized in a rational manner the work teams for the peasants living in mountainous regions and took measure to concentrate their houses in a certain area, thus making all of them enter the cooperatives.
It was another important factor for the successful implementation of agricultural cooperative to have set up the proper stage of development.
The DPRK applied the correct class policy in carrying out the agricultural cooperativization.
In the period of agricultural cooperativization class structure in rural areas is very complex and complicated and the peasants with different social and economic positions had different stand and attitude toward cooperativization. Therefore, the working-class party and state should apply the correct class policy suitable to the position of various peasants and their preparedness. Only then, can they lead the agricultural cooperativization to victory. Class policy in agricultural cooperativization is decided by which strata of the peasants the movement depends on and allies with and which strata of the peasants it considers as object.
The DPRK depended on the poor peasants, strengthened alliance with the middle ones and restricted and gradually transformed the rich ones.
When she began the agricultural cooperativization, the poor peasants occupied about 40% and the rich ones 0.6%. Rest of them was middle ones. This class status was decisively favourable for agricultural cooperativization.
The DPRK applied, first of all, the class policy of depending firmly on the poor peasants.
The poor peasants who had had no lands or means of production became masters of land thanks to the agrarian reform. That is why the poor peasants actively and sincerely supported the policy of cooperativization. In the stage of experience she organized cooperative with the poor peasants and core elements in the rural areas and consolidated them while she enabled the poor peasants to play a pivot role in all cooperatives.
The DPRK strengthened alliance with the middle peasants.
The middle peasants were working people doing farming by themselves and owners of their own lands and draught oxen. After the agrarian reform the people who became the middle peasants supported cooperativization at first. But the ones who had been origin of the middle peasants wavered and hesitated with the attitude to wait and see. The DPRK ceaselessly explained and persuaded such middle peasants and showed superiority of cooperative economy to them through the competition between the private economy and the cooperative one. The policy of maintaining the principle of voluntariness and making them recognize the superiority of cooperative economy throug
The DPRK did not confiscate and liquidate the rich peasants but restricted their exploiting aspects and transformed them gradually.
In consideration of characteristics of the rich peasants and the condition of them who were almost deteriorated during the war, the DPRK admitted into the cooperatives every rich peasant who wanted to do, to transform them into socialist working people and gave strict sanctions to the minority of the rich peasants who disturbed cooperativization. Most of the rich peasants voluntarily joined the cooperatives when the socialist transformation was pushed ahead in rural areas and the objects of their exploitation were gradually disappeared. Thanks to the correct class policy of the WPK, the socialist transformation of private peasant economy was done successfully in a short span of time.
The DPRK defined properly the mode of integrating means of production in the agricultural cooperativization.
Peasants lived for a long time with private ownership. So they are different in property status and ideological preparedness and their egoism and conservatism were strong. In such a circumstance it is necessary to correctly define the mode of integrating the means of production in conformity with the ideological consciousness level and economic situation of the peasants.
The DPRK integrated the means of production in various forms and methods in combination with forms of cooperatives.
In the form 1, peasants worked jointly with private ownership of means of production. So the problem of integrating means of production was not raised.
In the form 2, she integrated by investing lands except the peasants’ family kitchen plot allowed according to a certain criterion. Distribution was made not only by the work-points assessed by quantity and quality of common work with 20 % of the rest of the gross yield, except production fee, tax in kind, common accumulation and social and cultural fund but by the size of land donated to the cooperatives and the fertility of soil. In case a peasant did not work less than 120 days a year, his work-points couldn’t be assessed through the distribution by land. The DPRK did not integrate such means of production as draught oxen and farming equipment mechanically but integrated them according to their wish or made them remain private for some periods, thus utilizing them commonly. In case of integrating means of production she exchanged their price with cash or in kind. In case they commonly utilize private means of production in a year, the state paid them in cash or in kind at the end of the year.
Form 3 integrated all the lands and other means of production, making them common ownership. It only allowed every peasant household to possess about 30 phyong of family kitchen plot and some domestic animals and to do private sideline farming. It did not pay the price of the integrated lands and the price of means of production such as draught oxen and farming equipment was paid like in the form 2.
The original mode of integrating means of production was an important condition that enabled the DPRK to finish cooperativization smoothly in a short period of 4-5 years.
The DPRK correctly fix the size of cooperatives in the agricultural cooperativization.
In view of the essential requirement of the socialist common economy, it is good to make the size of agricultural cooperative economy big to some extent. When its size is big, it is possible to realize mechanization and irrigation and readjust lands effectively. But the size should not be fixed big without consideration of the mechanization level of the rural economy and the preparedness of the peasants. If their size is fixed big in such a condition that the mechanization level of the rural economy is low and the ideological consciousness of peasants and managing standard of the officials are low, it is impossible to administer and manage the rural economy properly and display its superiority to the full.
The DPRK fixed the size of cooperatives in conformity with the level of technical equipment, preparedness of the officials and the characteristics of the regions.
At first, the DPRK set the size of cooperatives with about 15-20 households, and gradually increased it into about 40-100 households in accordance with the maturity of various conditions. Even in the first period when the size of cooperative was fixed with about 15-20 households the managing officials could form cooperatives and administer the common economy in a rational way in spite of their low level.
When the experiences were accumulated and the managing level of the officials was improved in the stage of experience, she increased the number of households into about 40-100. She formed a cooperative with 40-50 households in the mountainous region where the villages were small and their households were scattered and 100 households in the middle and flat areas according to the size of the villages. The size of cooperative was fixed in conformity with the preparedness of officials and the characteristics of the regions. As a result, the cooperatives could be managed on a rational basis.
Like this, the DPRK completed successfully the cooperativization in a short period thanks to the original policy of cooperativization of the WPK, to the wise leadership of President Kim Il Sung and to the activity of the peasants.
The DPRK’s experience showed that agricultural economy could be cooperativized even such a condition that the primitive technology was predominant and that such cooperative economy was incomparably superior to the private one.
Thanks to the agricultural cooperativization, the rural areas in the DPRK have been changed into the socialist one where root cause of exploitation and poverty were removed completely and all people work and live happily, and the peasants who were petty owners in the past have become masters of the large-scale cooperative economy, the socialist working people.
